. We use the formula to invert the two years of price history prior to the recent crash on the Nasdaq (april 2000) and prior to the crash in the Hong Kong market associated with the Asian crisis in early 1994. These complex price dynamics are captured using only one exponent controlling the explosion, the variance and mean of the underlying random walk. This offers a new and powerful detection tool of speculative bubbles and herding behavior.
According to the efficient market hypothesis, the movement of financial prices are an immediate and unbiased reflection of incoming news about future earning prospects. Thus, any deviation from the random walk observed empirically would simply reflect similar deviations in extraneous signals feeding the market. In contrast, a large variety of models have been developed in the economic, finance and more recently physical literature which suggest that self-organization of the market dynamics is sufficient to create complexity endogenously. A relatively new school of research, championed in particular by the Santa Fe Institute in New Mexico [14, 15] and being developed now in several other institutions worldwide [16, 17, 18, 19] , views markets as complex evolutionary adaptive systems populated by boundedly rational agents interacting with each other. Several works have modelled the epidemics of opinion and speculative bubbles in financial markets from an adaptative agent point-of-view [20, 21, 22] . Other relevant works put more emphasis on the heterogeneity and threshold nature of decision making which lead in general to irregular cycles and critical behavior [23, 24, 25, 26, 27] . Experimental approaches to economics, started in the the mid-20th century, have also been actively used to examine propositions implied by economic theories of markets [28, 29] . In much of the literature on experimental economics [30, 31] , the rational expectations model has been the main benchmark against which to check the informational efficiency of experimental markets. Experiments on markets with insiders and uninformed traders [32] show that equilibrium prices do reveal insider information after several trials of the experiments, suggesting that the markets disseminate information efficiently, albeit under restricted conditions [32, 33] .
Notwithstanding a plethora of models which account approximately for the main stylized facts observed in stock markets, the characteristic structure of speculative bubbles is not captured at all. However, if speculative bubbles do exist, they probably constitute one of the most important empirical fact to explain and predict, due to their psychological effects (as witnessed by the medias and popular as well as economic press) and their financial impacts (potential losses of up to trillions of dollars during crashes and recession following these bubbles). Since the publication of the original contributions on rational expectations (RE) bubbles [34, 35] , a large literature has indeed emerged on theoretical refinements of the original concept and on the empirical detectability of RE bubbles in financial data (see [36] and [37] for surveys of this literature). Empirical research has largely concentrated on testing for explosive trends in the time series of asset prices and foreign exchange rates [38, 39] , with however limited success. The first reason lies in the absence of a general definition, as bubbles are model specific and generally defined from a rather restrictive framework. The concept of a fundamental price reference does not necessarily exist, nor is it necessarily unique. Many RE bubbles exhibit shapes that are hard to reconcile with the economic intuition or facts [40] . A major problem is that apparent evidence for bubbles can be reinterpreted in terms of market fundamentals that are unobserved by the researcher. Another suggestion is that, if stock prices are not more explosive than dividends, then it can be concluded that rational bubbles are not present, since bubbles are taken to generate an explosive component to stock prices. However, periodically collapsing bubbles are not detectable by using standard tests to determine whether stock prices are more explosive or less stationary than dividends [38] . In sum, the present evidence for speculative bubbles is fuzzy and unresolved at best.
We start from the celebrated geometric brownian model of the bubble price B(t), solidified into a paradigm by Black-Scholes option pricing model [41] , dB = µBdt + σBdW t , where µ is the instantaneous return rate, σ is the volatility and dW t is the infinitesimal increment of the random walk with unit variance (Wiener process). We generalize this expression into
allowing µ(B(t)) and σ(B(t)) to depend arbitrarily and nonlinearly on the instantaneous realization of the price. A jump term has been added to describe a correction or a crash of return amplitude κ, which can be a stochastic variable taken from an a priori arbitrary distribution. Immediately after the last crash which becomes the new origin of time 0, dj is reset to 0 and will eventually jump to 1 with a hazard rate h(t), defined such that the probability that a crash occurs between t and t + dt conditioned on not having occurred since time 0 is h(t)dt. Following [34, 35] , B(t) is a rational expectations bubble which accounts for the possibility, often discussed in the empirical literature and by practitioners, that observed prices may deviate significantly and over extended time intervals from fundamental prices. While allowing for deviations from fundamental prices, rational bubbles keep a fundamental anchor point of economic modelling, namely that bubbles must obey the condition of rational expectations. This translates essentially into the no-arbitrage condition, which states that the expectation of dB(t) conditioned on the past up to time t is zero. This allows us to determine the crash hazard rate h(t) as a function of B(t). Using the definition of the hazard rate h(t)dt = dj , where the bracket denotes the expectation over all possible outcomes since the last crash, this leads to µ(B(t))B(t) − κ B(t)h(t) = 0, which provides the hazard rate as a function of price:
Expression (2) quantifies the fact that the theory of rational expectations associates a risk to any price: for example, if the bubble price explodes, so will the crash hasard rate, so that the risk-return trade-off is always obeyed. This model generalizes Refs. [5, 42] by driving the hazard rate by the price, rather than the reverse. We now specify the dependence of µ(B(t)) and σ(B(t)) to capture the possible appearance of positive feedbacks on prices. There are many mechanisms in the stock market and in the behavior of investors which may lead to positive feedbacks. First, consider strategies used to hedge derivatives such as a so-called all option (which is a contract allowing the owner to buy a stock, say IBM, in the future at a pre-determined price): if the price goes up (down), the probability for the option to be exerted increases (decreases) and the issuer of the option must buy (sell) more of the underlying stock, thus providing a force for further appreciation (depreciation). Second, investment strategies with "insurance portfolio" are such that sell orders are issued whenever a loss threshold (or stop loss) is passed. It is clear that by increasing the volume of sell order, this may lead to further price decreases. Some commentators have indeed attributed the crash of Oct. 1987 to a cascade of sell orders. Third, there is a growing empirical evidence of the existence of herd or "crowd" behavior in speculative markets [43] , in fund behaviors [44, 45] and in the forecasts made by financial analysts [46] . Although this behavior is inefficient from a social standpoint, it can be rational from the perspective of managers who are concerned about their reputations in the labor market. Such behavior can be rational and may occur as an information cascade, a situation in which every subsequent actor, based on the observations of others, makes the same choice independent of his/her private signal [47] . Herding leads to positive nonlinear feedback. Another mechanism for positive feedbacks is the so-called "wealth" effect: a rise of the stock market increases the wealth of investors who spend more, adding to the earnings of companies, and thus increasing the value of their stock.
The evidence for nonlinearity has a strong empirical support: for instance, the coexistence of the absence of correlation of price changes and the strong autocorrelation of their absolute values can not be explained by any linear model [48] . Comparing additively nonlinear processes and multiplicatively nonlinear models, the later class of models are found consistent with empirical price changes and with options' implied volatilities [48] . With the additional insight that hedging strategies of general Black-Scholes option models lead to a positive feedback on the volatility [49] , we are led to propose a nonlinear model with multiplicative noise in which the return rate and the volatility are nonlinear increasing power law of B(t):
where B 0 , µ 0 and m > 0 are three parameters of the model, setting respectively a reference scale, an effective drift and the strength of the nonlinear positive feedback. The first term in the r.h.s. (3) is added as a convenient device to simplify the Ito calculation of these stochastic differential equations. The model can be reformulated in the Stratonovich interpretation dB dt
where a and b are two constants and η is a delta-correlated Gaussian white noise, in physicist's notation such that ηdt ≡ dW . The form (5) examplifies the fundamental ingredient of our theory based on the interplay between nonlinearity and multiplicative noise. The nonlinearity creates a singularity in finite time and the multiplicative noise makes it stochastic. Here, we quote only the solution of (1) with (3) and (4), and refer to [50] for details of the derivation. The bubble price B(t), conditioned on no crash occuring (dj = 0), is given by [50] 
with t c = y 0 /(m − 1)µ 0 is a constant determined by the initial condition. Expression (6) is our main formal result and is illustrated in figure 1 . To grasp its meaning, let us first consider the deterministic case σ 0 = 0, such that the return rate µ(B) ∝ [B(t)] m−1 is the sole driving term. Then, (6) reduces to
, a positive feedback m > 1 of the price B(t) on the return rate µ creates a finite-time singularity at a critical time t c determined by the initial starting point. This power law acceleration of the price accounts for the effect of herding resulting from the positive feedback. It is in agreement with the empirical finding that price peaks have sharp concave upwards maxima [13] . Reintroducing the stochastic component σ 0 = 0, we see from (6) that the finite-time singularity still exists but its visit is controlled by the first passage of a biased random walk at the position µ 0 t c such that the denominator
In practice, a price trajectory will never sample the finite-time singularity as it is not allowed to approach too close to it due to the jump process dj defined in (1). Indeed, from the no-arbitrage condition, the expression (2) for the crash hazard rate ensures that when the price explodes, so does h(t) so that a crash will occur with larger and larger probability, ultimately screening the divergence which can never be reached. We stress the remarkably simple and elegant constraint on the dynamics provided by the rational expectation condition that ensures the existence and stationarity of the dynamics at all times, nothwithstanding the locally nonlinear stochastic explosive dynamics.
In agreement with empirical observations, returns ln[B(t + τ )/B(t)] are uncorrelated by definition of the RE dynamics (1) with (2) . The absolute values of the returns exhibit long-range correlations in good agreement with empirical data. As shown in figure 2 , the correlation function decays extremely slowly with a decay approximately linear in the logarithm of time [12] (which is also compatible with a power law decay with a small exponent). This behavior is associated with clustering of volatility driven by the nonlinear hyperbolic structure of the dynamics (6). This result is obtained by averaging over many bubbles. Conditioned on a single bubble and provided no crash has yet occurred, the correlation function can actually be non-stationary and grow with time as the bubble approaches stochastically the critical time t c . This prediction of our model is actually born out by measurements of price dynamics prior to the major crashes, which will be reported in full details elsewhere [50] . Figure 3 shows that the empirical distribution of returns is also recovered with no adjustment of parameters. To construct a meaningful distribution, we have added a constant fundamental price F to the bubble price B(t) as only their sum is observable in real life:
We can also include the possibility for a interest rate r or growth of the economy with rate r. Different curves for various values of F demonstrate the remarkable robustness of the distributions with respect to the choice of the unknown fundamental value. We observe an approximate power law decay with exponent close to 1.5 in an intermediate regime, followed by a faster decay with exponent approximately 4, in agreement with previously reported values [10, 52] . These apparent power law result from the superposition of the contribution of many bubbles approaching towards their finite-time singularity within varying distances constrained by the underlying random walk process and the crash hazard rate. For each single bubble, there is an exact asymptotic truncated power law behavior that can be obtained analytically [50] from the expression (6). In particular, one can show that the distribution of return over a complete trajectory of a given bubble is a power law with exponent (m − 1)/m less than 1. It is the combination of these truncated power laws and the mixture of bubble and fundamental prices that give rise to distributions in agreement with empirical facts. This suggests that the attention given to the distribution of returns in the physical literature may have overemphasized its significance.
To demonstrate that our model capture most of the detailled structure of price time series at times preceding crashes, we use expression (7) with (6) to invert the real price time series and obtain the value of the key variables of the model. We focus here on two examples, the Hang Seng index of the Hong Kong market prior to the crash which occurred in early 1994 and the Nasdaq composite index prior to the crash of April 2000. Other examples are reported in [50] . To implement the inversion of (7) with (6), we note that if these equations represent the market behavior faithfully, then starting from a real price time series P (t), the times serieŝ
should be a bias random walk, characterized by a constant drift M = mu 0 /α and volatility √ V = σ 0 /αB m 0 . In other words, the inversion (8) should whiten and gaussianize the empirical price series. This inversion has the important advantage of not requiring the determination of the critical time t c which appears as a constant term inŴ (t).
To test this hypothesis, we start from an arbitrary set of the five parameters m, V, M, r, F of the model and constructŴ (t) using (8). We then analyzeŴ (t) to check whether it is indeed a pure random walk. For this, we use a battery of tests, of which we discuss here only one: the distance of the distribution ofŴ (t) from a Gaussian distribution. We have used the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test and Anderson-Darling test to qualify the quality of the Gaussian description ofŴ (t). We use the KS distance as a cost function to minimize to get the optimal set of parameters m, V, M, r, F . We have organized hierarchically the search and find [50] that the two leading parameters explaining most of the data are the exponent m and the variance V of the random walk as it should. The quality of the inversion is weakly sensitive to M , even less to r and almost insensitive to the fundamental value F , suggesting that observed prices at times of accelerated bubbles are mostly determined by the bubble component. Figure 4 shows the cumulative distribution of the best reconstructedŴ (t) and of the empirical prices and their fit by a cumulative Gaussian distribution, for the Hang Seng 1994 and Nasdaq 2000 bubbles. The inversion procedure is almost perfect for the Hang Seng index and of good quality but not perfect for the Nasdaq index. For the Hang Seng bubble, the KS confidence level that the distribution is Gaussian goes from 11% to 96% when going from the empirical price to the transformed variableŴ (t) defined by (8) . In other words, the whitening inversion is such that it is not possible to reject the hypothesis thatŴ (t) is a genuine random walk, while the corresponding hypothesis for the empirical price is rejected. For the Nasdaq bubble, the gain in statistical significance is less striking, from 73% to 86% but the visual appearance of the fits is significantly better. Figure 5 shows ten random time evolutions of the process (7) with the above best parameter values with distinct random realizations of synthetic random walksŴ (t) for both bubbles and compare them with the empirical prices. This figure underlines an interesting difference between the Hang Seng and the Nasdaq bubbles: the fundamental price component of the former is negligible compared to its contribution in the later. Therefore, while the price behavior of the Hang Seng index in the bubble ending in 1994 can be interpreted as mostly of a speculative and herding nature, the price behavior of the Nasdaq bubble is much more rooted in a fundamental behavior even if the bubble component is three times larger than the fundamental component. Figure 5 illustrates also the fact that the empirical prices can be seen as specific realizations among an ensemble of possible scenarios. Our model is able to capture remarkably well the visual acceleration of these indices as a function of time. We stress that standard models of exponential growth would not give such a good fit.
Our nonlinear model with positive feedback together with the inversion procedure (8) provides a new direct tool for detecting bubbles, for identifying their starting times and the plausible ends. Changing the initial time of the time series, the KS probability of the resulting Gaussian fit of the transformed seriesŴ (t) allows us to determine the starting date beyond which the model becomes inadequate at a given statistical level. Furthermore, the exponent m (or equivalently α) provides a direct measure of the speculative mood. m = 1 is the normal regime, while m > 1 quantifies a positive self-reinforcing feedback. This opens the possibility to continuously monitor it via the inversion formula (8) and use it as a "thermometer" of speculation, as will be reported elsewhere [50] . Furthermore, the variance V of the multiplicative noise is a robust measure of volatility. Its continuous monitoring via the inversion formula (8) suggests new ways at looking at dependence between assets, in the spirit of but generalizing the nonlinear transformation of [53] . Expression (6) also rationalizes why it is so difficult to develop reliable statistics on bubbles. Since their occurrence is associated with the approach of the random walk W (t) to a level at which a singularity occurs, the theory of first approach or of first returns of random walks indicate that the distribution of waiting times between bubbles has a long tail decaying as t −3/2 such that the average waiting time is infinite: bubbles come in clusters and one can sometimes wait a very long time before observing one. This feature is a direct prediction of our theory. We note that our theory also applies to "anti-bubbles" or strong "bear" regimes, such as the behavior of the Nasdaq Composite index since its crash until present times. Positive feedback can also work to worsen things down, not only to hype prices up. This will be reported elsewhere [50] .
In summary, we have presented a nonlinear model with positive feedback and multiplicative noise, which explains in a parsimonious and economically intuitive way essentially all the characteristics of empirical financial time series, including the spontaneous emergence of speculative bubbles. It could provide a simple starting point for multivariate modelling of financial and economic variables. (such that one time step corresponds typically to one day of trading on the Nasdaq composite index, calibrated by comparing the daily volatilities), B 0 = 1 and W c = 1. The underlying random walk W (t) (second panel), the bubble daily increments dB (third panel) and random walk increments dW (bottom panel) are also shown. Notice the intermittent bursts of strong volatility in the bubble compared to the featureless constant level of fluctuations of the random walk. A numerical simulation of this process requires a discretization of the time in steps on size δt. Then, knowing the value of the randow walk W (t − δt) and the bubble price B(t − δt) at the previous time t − δt, we construct W (t) by adding an increment taken from the centered Gaussian distribution with variance δt. From this, we construct B(t) using (6). We then read off from (2) what is the probability h(t)δt for a crash to occur during the next time step. We compare this probability to a random number ran uniformely drawn in the interval [0, 1] and trigger a crash if ran ≤ h(t)δt. In this case, the price B(t) is changed into B(t)(1 − κ), where κ is drawn from a prechosen distribution. In the simulations presented below, the drop κ is fixed at 20%. It is straightforward to generalize to an arbitrary distribution of jumps. After the crash, the dynamics proceeds incrementally as before, starting from this new value. If ran > h(t)δt, no crash occurs and the dynamics can be iterated another time step. The highly nonlinear formula (6) transforms a featureless random walk (second and fourth panels) into a structured time series with intermittent volatility bursts (first and third panels). (7) with the best parameter values given in figure 4 with distinct random realizations of synthetic random walksŴ (t) for both bubbles and comparison with the empirical prices shown as the thick lines (one time step corresponds to one trading day). The smooth continuous line close to the horizontal axis is the fundamental price F e rt : the Hang Seng price was mostly a bubble growth as the observed price is much larger and increasing much faster than the fundamental price. The Nasdaq price had a stronger fundamental component and the acceleration of the bubble was not much stronger than that of the fundamental price.
